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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in the amount of 
alimony it awarded to Ms. Penrose. The standard of appellate 
review is a "clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion." Paffel v. 
Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986); accord Chambers v. Chambers, 
840 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in its valuation 
and division of property and debts awarded to the parties. The 
standard of appellate review is a clear abuse of discretion. 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah Ct.App. 1994). 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in the amount of 
child support it awarded to Ms. Penrose for the benefit of the 
parties* minor child. The standard of appellate review is a clear 
abuse of discretion. Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah Ct.App. 
1995). 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not awarding 
Ms. Penrose any of her attorney fees and costs. The standard of 
appellate review is a clear abuse of discretion. Wells v. Wells, 
871 P.2d 1036 (Utah Ct.App. 1994). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Ann, § 30-3-5. See Addendum A for a complete 
recitation of that section. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.12. See Addendum A for a 
complete recitation of that section. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.14. See Addendum A for a 
complete recitation of that section. 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7(3). See Addendum A for a 
complete recitation of that section. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Course of Proceedings. 
Karen Penrose ("Ms. Penrose") filed for divorce on June 8, 
1993, to dissolve her thirteen year marriage to Jeffrey Penrose 
("Mr. Penrose"). The case was tried before Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
in the Third Judicial District Court on June 14, 15, and 16, 1995. 
The court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce on October 18, 1995. The Decree of Divorce 
provided for the following: 
1. The parties were awarded joint legal custody of their 
minor son. Ms. Penrose was awarded primary physical custody. Mr. 
Penrose was awarded reasonable rights of visitation. 
2. Mr. Penrose was ordered to pay child support in the 
amount of $669.00 per month. 
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3. Mr. Penrose was ordered to pay alimony for an indefinite 
period of time in the amount of $1,331.00 per month. 
4. Mr. Penrose was awarded the parties' business, Designers 
Carpet Showroom. The parties divided approximately $178,000.00 
maintained in an escrow account from the sale of the parties' 
marital residence, of which Ms. Penrose ultimately was awarded 
$109,000.00, and Mr. Penrose was awarded $69,000.00. Mr. Penrose 
was awarded a Bronco valued at $8,000.00, two snowmobiles at a 
combined valued of $13,000.00, and a trailer valued at $2,000.00. 
Ms. Penrose was awarded a BMW which she leases. The court ascribed 
a value of $12,000.00 to the BMW, the value of the vehicle Ms. 
Penrose sold to obtain the BMW. Mr. Penrose was awarded a 
$69,000.00 Certificate of Deposit which the court valued at 
$29,000.00 for purposes of property division. The parties' 40% 
interest in Utah Water Sports was divided equally, with no present 
value ascribed. The court ordered Mr. Penrose to repay a 
$40,000.00 debt to his grandmother, and Ms. Penrose to repay all 
debts to her father, which total over $100,000.00. 
5. The parties were ordered to bear their own attorneys fees 
and costs. 
On November 13, 1995, Ms. Penrose filed her Notice of Appeal. 
4 
B. Statement of Facts, 
1. The parties were married on August 24, 1982, in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and divorced on October 18, 1995, a marriage of 
approximately 13 years. (Exhibit A 1f 2; Tr. Vol. I, p. 21). 
2. At the time of trial, Ms. Penrose was 34 years old. (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 23). 
3. During the marriage the parties had one child, a son, 
born as issue of the marriage. At the time of trial, their son was 
six years of age. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 21). 
4. The parties were awarded joint legal custody of their 
son, with primary physical custody awarded to Ms. Penrose. 
(Exhibit B 1[ 2) . 
5. Ms. Penrose's role within the family since the birth of 
their son has primarily been that of full-time wife and mother. 
(Exhibit A 1f 5; Tr. Vol. I, p. 27). 
6. Ms. Penrose is not employed, and has not been employed 
since the birth of the parties' son, with the sole exception of 
limited unpaid work performed for the parties' business, Designer's 
Carpet Showroom. (Exhibit A if 5; Tr. Vol. I, p. 27). 
7. Ms. Penrose's post-high school education consists of 
approximately one year of college and a study abroad program. 
(Exhibit A 1f 5; Tr. Vol. I, pp. 24-25). 
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8. Ms. Penrose has been advised by her physician that she 
will require significant surgery in the foreseeable future. (Tr. 
Vol. I, pp. 34-35). 
9. Approximately one month after their marriage, the parties 
moved to Hawaii, where they began and operated a jet ski rental 
business. They sold the business in 1988 for $350,000.00.2 
(Exhibit A V 5; Tr. Vol. I, p. 44). 
10. After the purchase of the parties' next business, 
Designers Carpet Showroom, in 1988, Ms. Penrose's primary source of 
income was money given to her by Mr. Penrose. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 33-
34). 
11. Despite evidence presented by Ms. Penrose that her 
current monthly expenses, for herself and the parties' minor son, 
totalled $5,974.04, the court found that Ms. Penrose's "reasonable" 
monthly expenses were approximately $3,800. (Exhibit A. 1F 9). 
12. Despite the fact that Ms. Penrose had not been employed 
on a full-time basis since the birth of the parties1 son, the court 
found that she could obtain full-time work at approximately $7.00 
per hour. The court further found that Ms. Penrose could 
contribute approximately $900.00 net per month to her own living 
There is some discrepancy as to what amount the Penroses 
actually received from the sale. Ms. Penrose testified to 
$80,000.00, Mr. Penrose testified to $60,000.00. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 
44; Tr. Vol. II, p. 267). 
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expenses. The court also found that Ms. Penrose received 
approximately $900.00 per month from stock accounts. 
(Exhibit A If 5). 
13. The court established Mr. Penrose's gross monthly income 
at $8,932.00. (Exhibit A If 5). 
14. Mr. Penrose's income allowed the parties to acquire a 
home with a resale value of $500,000.00, as well as items such as 
two snowmobiles, and luxury automobiles including a Porsche 914, 
purchased for approximately $30,000.00, and a Mercedes-Benz 560SL 
convertible, purchased for approximately $50,000.00. (Tr. Vol. I., 
pp. 73-74). 
15. The parties enjoyed a luxurious lifestyle, including 
extensive travel to Europe, Asia, California, Hawaii, and the 
Caribbean, frequent snowmobiling and waterskiing trips, and season 
tickets to Utah Jazz basketball games, at a cost of approximately 
$2,200.00 per year. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 77, 79). 
16. Mr. Penrose's income enabled Ms. Penrose to spend a 
significant amount of money on personal items, including 
approximately $2,500.00 per month on clothing. Ms. Penrose also 
had regular manicure and haircare appointments, custom designed 
furniture, and outside assistance with childcare and housework. 
The parties purchased significant gifts for each other, including 
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jewelry, furs, artwork, and electronic equipment. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 
77-78, 149-155). 
17. Although Mr. Lloyd Hansen, Ms. Penrose's father, did 
contribute to the parties' income from time to time, particularly 
while they were living in Hawaii at the beginning of their 
marriage, Mr. Penrose's income provided the parties with the 
luxuries and lifestyle they enjoyed. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 384-388). 
18. Based upon a monthly income of $8,932.00, the court fixed 
Mr. Penrose's monthly child support obligation at $669.00. 
(Exhibit B 1f 3) . 
19. The court likewise found that due to the fact that Ms. 
Penrose has been out of the job market for a number of years, and 
considering Mr. Penrose's income, Ms. Penrose was to be awarded 
permanent alimony; (Exhibit A 1f 9) but that she could contribute 
approximately $1,200.00 per month toward her own support. (Exhibit 
A If 5). 
20. Despite the fact that (i) Ms. Penrose has not been 
employed outside the home since the parties' move to Utah, with the 
exception of limited work at the parties' business (Exhibit A 1f ; 
Tr, Vol. I, pp. ); (ii) Ms. Penrose has very limited formal 
training and education (Exhibit A If 5; Tr. Vol. I, pp. 24-25); 
(iii) Ms. Penrose's documented monthly obligations total in excess 
of $5,974.04 (Tr. Vol. I, p. 204); (iv) Mr. Penrose has monthly 
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expenses that are insignificant in amount (Tr. Vol. II, p. 388); 
(v) Mr. Penrose's monthly income was found to be $8,932.00 (Exhibit 
A 1f 5); the trial court awarded Ms. Penrose alimony in the amount 
of only $1,331.00 per month (Exhibit A If 9) . 
21. Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the parties' 
business, Designers Carpet Showroom, was valued at $194,000.00. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 136). 
22. The court awarded Designers Carpet Showroom to Mr. 
Penrose. Despite the fact that the business "has significant 
value," the court valued the business "at $0 for purposes of 
distributing the parties' property," due to a tax liability, the 
amount of which has not yet been conclusively determined. (Exhibit 
A ir 13(a) ). 
23. The court ordered Mr. Penrose to repay a $40,000.00 debt 
to his grandmother from the proceeds of a $69,000.00 Certificate of 
Deposit awarded to Mr. Penrose. (Exhibit A 1f 13(c)). 
24. The court ordered Ms. Penrose to repay all debts to her 
father, which total $107,891.31, but did not grant her an asset 
with which to do so. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 170; Exhibit A 1f 14). 
25. The court valued the $69,000.00 Certificate of Deposit 
awarded to Mr. Penrose at $29,000.00 for purposes of property 
distribution due to the offset in the amount of $40,000.00 
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represented by the debt owing to Mr. Penrose's grandmother. 
(Exhibit A If 13 (c) ). 
26. The court divided approximately $178,000.00 maintained in 
an escrow account from the sale of the parties' marital residence 
between the parties. Ms. Penrose ultimately was awarded 
$109,000.00, and Mr. Penrose was awarded $69,000.00. (Exhibit A, 
V 13(g)). 
27. Mr. Penrose was awarded a Bronco valued at $8,000.00, two 
snowmobiles at a combined valued of $13,000.00, and a trailer 
valued at $2,000.00. Ms. Penrose was awarded a BMW which she 
leases, for which a value of $12,000.00 was ascribed. (Exhibit A, 
If 13(g)). 
28. The court ordered both parties to pay their own attorney 
fees and costs. (Exhibit A 1[ 15). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court clearly abused its discretion in four areas. 
First, the amount of alimony awarded to Ms. Penrose is insufficient 
to allow her to continue the standard of living enjoyed during the 
course of the marriage. The evidence at trial established that Mr. 
Penrose's income, which did not change substantially during the 
course of the marriage, allowed the parties to become accustomed to 
a lifestyle that included luxury homes, cars, and substantial 
travel. Ms. Penrose, who acquired few marketable skills, is unable 
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to continue this standard of living on the trial court's alimony 
award of only $1,331.00 per month. In addition, the alimony award 
does not achieve parity of income between the parties. 
Second, the property distribution and division of debts is 
inequitable and constitutes an abuse of discretion on the part of 
the trial court. The court required both parties to repay debts to 
family members; however, it granted only Mr. Penrose an asset with 
which to do so, despite the fact that Ms. Penrose's debt to her 
father is much larger, and Mr. Penrose has much greater earning 
capacity. The valuation of the property awarded is erroneous; the 
Certificate of Deposit awarded Mr. Penrose was valued at only 
$29,000.00, despite its face value of $69,000.00, and the parties' 
business was valued at $0, despite its history of steady growth and 
increasing income. 
Third, the child support award is inadequate in light of Mr. 
Penrose's established monthly income of $8,932.00 per month, and 
the parties' combined income of $11,032.00 per month. 
Finally, the trial court erred in requiring the parties to 
bear their own attorney fees and costs without considering the 
factors required by Utah law; specifically, Ms. Penrose's need, Mr. 
Penrose's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the fees. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN SETTING THE ALIMONY AWARD 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ALIMONY FAILS TO ENABLE MS. 
PENROSE TO MAINTAIN THE SAME STANDARD OF LIVING SHE 
ENJOYED DURING THE PARTIES1 MARRIAGE 
Utah courts have clearly set forth the purposes of an award of 
alimony. The paramount purpose is to: 
enabl[e] the receiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as 
possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage, and preventing the receiving spouse from 
becoming a public charge. 
Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 (Ut.Ct.App. 1990). 
Although there are circumstances where there is simply not 
enough to go around, that is not the case here. The court made the 
express finding that Mr. Penrose had a monthly income of $8,932.00. 
That income allowed the parties to acquire substantial assets, 
including a successful business which the parties built together, 
a home valued at $500,000.00, snowmobiles, luxury automobiles, 
substantial travel, and luxurious gifts. 
The evidence further established that Mr. Penrose's personal 
expenses were minimal in amount. At the time of the divorce, he 
was not making any mortgage payments or car payments, and had a 
rent obligation of approximately $300.00 per month. Finally, the 
evidence established that Ms. Penrose's monthly expenses totalled 
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not less than $5,974.04, and that she lacked formal training or 
education, and had been dependent on Mr. Penrose for support since 
the birth of the parties' son. 
Mr. Penrose's income, which allowed the parties to enjoy a 
well-to-do standard of living, had not materially diminished during 
the course of the marriage, nor had Mr. Penrose incurred expenses 
which would materially affect his ability to provide support for 
Ms. Penrose. Ms. Penrose, on the other hand, is not capable of 
providing any significant level of support for herself, certainly 
not a level sufficient to meet her established monthly needs. 
Simply stated, the Penroses established a very comfortable 
standard of living during their marriage which Ms. Penrose is not 
capable of maintaining on her own. Mr. Penrose, however, continues 
to be able to provide Ms. Penrose the financial support necessary 
to allow her to continue her established lifestyle. Mr. Penrose's 
established income, and the parties' established marital standard 
of living are undisputed. Accordingly, there is no reason why Ms. 
Penrose is not entitled to a continuation of the same level of 
support she enjoyed during the marriage. 
The only remaining question is whether the trial court's award 
is sufficient to provide Ms. Penrose the alimony to which she is 
legally and factually entitled. The answer is an unequivocal no! 
The trial court found that Ms. Penrose's average monthly expenses 
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were approximately $3,800.00, despite the fact that the evidence 
established that her monthly expenses, based upon her marital 
standard of living, totalled not less than $5,974.04. The court 
offered no explanation for this reduction, stating only that Ms. 
Penrose's claimed expenses were "excessive." (Exhibit "A," If 9). 
The court failed to address that fact that Ms. Penrose's 
uncontroverted2 testimony established expenses of $5,974.04. The 
court's award of a total level of support of $2,000.00 per month 
($669.00 in child support and $1,331.00 in alimony) is clearly 
inadequate to allow Ms. Penrose to maintain her marital standard of 
living. The trial court's inadequate award is particularly 
objectionable in light of the fact that Mr. Penrose's income is 
sufficient to allow Ms. Penrose to do so. 
In Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Ut.Ct.App. 1991), this 
Court affirmed that, in allowing the receiving spouse to maintain 
the marital standard of living, the alimony award should also be 
based upon the receiving spouse's station in life and the payor 
spouse's ability to pay. This Court found that 
the court should set alimony . . . to approximate the 
parties' standard of living during the marriage as 
closely as possible. If follows that if the payor 
spouse's resources are adequate, alimony need not be 
2
 Although Mr. Penrose stated that he thought some of Ms. 
Penrose's claimed expenses were "high," he offered no support for 
this conclusion, and had not seen any of her bills. (Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 244-246. 
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limited to provide for only basic needs, but should also 
consider the recipient spouse's "station in life." 
Id. at 1212; see also Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615 
(Ut.Ct.App. 1988) (alimony award should be affirmed to allow wife 
of twelve years to maintain her marital standard of living, in 
light of the fact that she had no professional training and few 
marketable skills, and defendant was clearly able to pay); Morgan 
v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559 (Utah Ct.App. 1993) (alimony award upheld 
where receiving spouse's role was that of homemaker, income from 
property division would not allow her to maintain her marital 
standard of living, and payor spouse had ability to pay). 
Here, the trial court abused its discretion by awarding 
alimony in an amount which will not allow Ms. Penrose to continue 
her marital standard of living, despite Mr. Penrose's proven 
ability to provide such support. 
B. THE ALIMONY AWARD FAILS TO EQUALIZE MR. PENROSE AND MS. 
PENROSE'S STANDARDS OF LIVING 
One of the primary objectives of an alimony award is to 
equalize the parties' standards of living. This Court has 
instructed that "alimony should, as far as possible, equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living." Munns v. Munns, 790 P. 2d 
116, 121 (Utah Ct.App. 1991) (citing Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 
1144, 1146 (Ut.Ct.App. 1988)). Here, the trial court's alimony 
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award fails to realize this goal, and leaves the parties with 
grossly disproportionate standards of living. 
Based upon a monthly gross income of $8,932.00, Mr. Penrose 
will have a pre-tax disposable income of $6,932.00 after meeting 
his child support and alimony obligations. Ms. Penrose, on the 
other hand, will have a pre-tax disposable income of $4,100.00, 
based upon the trial court's total support award of $2,000.00, her 
stock income, and the trial court's imputed gross income of 
$1,200.00 per month. This is assuming, of course, that Ms. Penrose 
is able to secure such employment. The trial court's award, then, 
leaves Mr. Penrose with approximately $2,832.00 more than Ms. 
Penrose in monthly gross income. 
In determining an award of alimony in a divorce, the trial 
court is obligated to divide the income equitably. As the Utah 
Supreme Court has plainly stated: 
The overarching aim of a property division, and of the 
decree of which it and the alimony award are subsidiary 
parts, is to achieve a fair, just and equitable result 
between the parties. 
Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added) 
See also Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) (one 
of the primary considerations in achieving such fairness and equity 
is to equalize the parties' respective standards of living). 
This Court has not hesitated to remand alimony awards which 
fail to equalize the parties' standards of living. In Howell v. 
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Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct.App. 1991), the defendant testified 
to monthly expenses of approximately $5,000.00. The plaintiff had 
a monthly income of $10,000.00 per month. The court awarded 
alimony and child support in the amount of $3,163.00, and found 
that the defendant had the ability to earn a salary of $645.00 per 
month. 
This Court held that this award was insufficient, noting that, 
M[t]he alimony set by the court does not come close to equalizing 
the parties' standard of living as of the time of the divorce, but 
allows plaintiff a two to four times advantage." Id. at 1213. 
Here, Mr. Penrose receives almost $3,000.00 more gross income 
per month than Ms. Penrose. Mr. Penrose earns a substantial salary 
from his property award of a successful business. He testified 
that his monthly obligations are minimal, consisting mainly of 
$300.00 per month in rent. Ms. Penrose, on the other hand, 
introduced evidence of a number of financial obligations. The 
inequity of the trial court's distribution of income is stark and 
undeniable. The award of alimony must be overturned on this basis 
alone, and an award entered which meets the required goal of 
equalizing the parties' standards of living. 
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II. 
THE DIVISION OF MARITAL DEBTS AND PROPERTY IS INEQUITABLE 
A. THE DIVISION OF DEBTS IS INEQUITABLE 
The trial court abused its discretion by directing both 
parties to repay debts to family members, and awarding Mr. Penrose 
a $69,000.00 asset with which to do so, without doing the same for 
Ms. Penrose. 
The trial court directed Mr. Penrose to repay a $40,000.00 
loan from his grandmother. Ms. Penrose was ordered to repay debts 
to her father, which total over $100,000.00. The court then 
awarded Mr. Penrose a certificate of deposit in the amount of 
$69,000.00, and required him to repay his grandmother from that 
asset. However, the court gave Ms. Penrose no asset with which to 
repay her $100,000.00 debt. (Exhibit A, 1f 13(c), 14). 
This division of debts is facially inequitable and a clear 
abuse of the discretion by the trial court. The evidence presented 
at trial showed that Ms. Penrose had little formal education and 
virtually no formal training. She has not been employed for some 
years, and, should she be able to find employment, could be 
expected to earn only about $2,100.00 per month. Mr. Penrose, on 
the other hand, earns a substantial salary. In Baker v. Baker, 866 
P.2d 540 (Utah Ct.App. 1993), this Court noted that it is entirely 
proper to consider the parties' relative income and earning power 
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when dividing debts. "f[T]he law contemplates a fair and 
equitable, not an equal, division of the marital debts1 
[g]iven the relative earning capacities and current state of 
employment of the Bakers, the trial court properly placed the 
burden of the marital debt on Mr. Baker . . . . " Id. at 543 
(citing Sinclair v. Sinclair, 718 P.2d 396, 398 (Utah 1986)). 
Here, the court awarded Mr. Penrose an asset with which to 
repay his family debts without doing the same for Ms. Penrose. The 
Court failed, however, to consider or address the parties1 
differing earning capacities and employment situations. The 
court's division of debts under these circumstances is a clear 
abuse of discretion. 
B. THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY IN THE DIVISION OF 
ASSETS IS IMPROPER. 
The trial court's valuation of the assets awarded to Mr. 
Penrose is an abuse of discretion. The court significantly 
undervalued the certificate of deposit and the parties' business, 
Designers Carpet Showroom, Inc., both of which were awarded to Mr. 
Penrose. 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court 
awarded Designers Carpet Showroom to Mr. Penrose. Due to a 
contingent sales tax liability associated with the business, the 
court assigned a value of $0 to the asset, despite the fact that it 
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"has significant value as evidenced by historical and present 
earnings." (Exhibit A, 1f 13(a)). 
The valuation of the business at $0 is contrary to the 
evidence presented at trial and to Utah law. The parties 
stipulated to Mr. Stephen Nicolatus's valuation of the business at 
approximately $194,000.00. Although it is true that the business 
bears a sales tax liability to the State of Utah, the amount of 
this liability had not been conclusively determined. It is 
patently unjust to award Mr. Penrose an asset valued at $0 which 
may actually be worth much more. This is particularly true here, 
since the court's own Finding of Fact imply that the tax liability 
is not expected to destroy the value of the business. The court 
noted that "[d]efendant will have the ability to pay the 
indebtedness and continue to earn income consistent with the 
pattern of historical earnings and business growth." (Exhibit A, 
If 13(a)). 
Furthermore, the trial court awarded Mr. Penrose the Key Bank 
Certificate of Deposit valued at $69,000.00. However, for purposes 
of property distribution, the court assigned a value of only 
$29,000.00 to that asset. The court then awarded Ms. Penrose 
$109,000.00 from the parties' escrow account; however, the court 
valued the asset at its full cash value, despite the fact that Ms. 
Penrose is required to repay approximately $100,000.00 to her 
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father presumably from that asset/ The net effect of the trial 
court's valuation was to award Mr. Penrose a $69,000.00 asset and 
a successful business capable of generating significant future 
income, with a combined valuation of only $29,000.00 for property 
distribution purposes. Ms. Penrose, on the other hand, received 
only a $109,000.00 asset, from which she must repay a debt 
totalling nearly that same amount, and a leased vehicle valued at 
$12,000.00. Without question, such an award is patently 
unequitable and unsupportable. 
III. 
THE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD WAS NOT APPROPRIATELY DETERMINED 
A. THE TRIAL COURT WAS REQUIRED TO CONSIDER THE FACTORS OF 
U.C.A. § 78-45-7(3). 
Utah law requires the trial court to fashion a just and 
equitable child support award when the adjusted gross income of the 
parents exceeds the statutory guidelines. This mandates the 
consideration of the factors enumerated in U.C.A. § 78-45-7(3). 
Here, the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
offer no consideration of these factors. 
The trial court found that the parties' adjusted gross monthly 
income was $11,032.00, and ordered Mr. Penrose to make child 
At least the property distribution ordered by the Court 
awarded no other asset to Ms. Penrose from which the debt could be 
paid. 
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support payments of $669.00 per month. This amount is consistent 
with the amount provided in the child support guideline table for 
an adjusted gross monthly income of $10,001.00 to $10,100.00. 
U.C.A. § 78-45-7.14 (Supp.Vol. 1995). However, the court failed to 
recognize that this is the minimum amount allowable, and to enter 
an award commensurate with the parties' income. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.12 provides 
[i]f the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the 
highest level specified in the table, an appropriate and 
just child support amount shall be ordered on a case-by-
case basis, but the amount ordered may not be less than 
the highest level specified in the table for the number 
of children due support. 
U.C.A. § 78-45-7.12 (Supp.Vol. 1995) (emphasis added). 
This language, effective July 1, 1994, must be distinguished 
from the previous statute, which provided only that an appropriate 
and just amount may be ordered on a case-by-case basis. The 
replacement of "may" with "shall" evidences a legislative intent to 
require the court to consider the parties' true income, rather than 
mechanically apply the highest level of the table. 
Although there has been no Utah law interpreting the revised 
statute, the Colorado Court of Appeals interpreted a similar 
statute in In Re Marriage of LeBlanc, 800 P.2d 1384 (Colo.App. 
1990). The LeBlanc court found that the trial court erred by 
awarding the minimum presumptive amount of support where the 
parties1 combined income exceeded the highest guideline level. The 
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trial court was required, but failed to consider the relevant 
factors of Colorado law4. The court remanded the decision, 
directing the trial court to make further findings regarding "the 
standard of living and financial needs of the children . . . 
Id. at 1388. 
Here, section 78-45-7(3) provides a list of the factors to be 
considered in fashioning an appropriate and just child support 
award under section 78-45-7.12. The factors include, but are not 
limited to 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
(f) the ages of the parties; and 
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for 
the support of others. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7(3) (Supp.Vol. 1995). 
Noticeably absent from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law in this case is any reference to these factors. Although 
consideration of the factors was not required under the previous 
version of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.125, the mandatory language of 
4
 C.R.S. § 14-10-115(1) (1987 Repl.Vol. 6B) . 
5
 In Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540 (Utah Ct.App. 1993), this 
Court held that these factors should be applied only when there is 
sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines. However, Baker was 
decided before the revision of U.C.A. § 78-45-7.12 (Supp.Vol. 
1995). 
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the revised statute, which requires the court to fashion an 
appropriate award when income exceeds the guidelines, makes 
consideration of these factors compulsory. The trial court abused 
its discretion by applying the highest guideline amount for child 
support without considering any of the factors required by Utah 
law. 
B. THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED IN THIS CASE REQUIRED DEPARTURE 
FROM THE GUIDELINES 
Assuming, arguendo, that the revision of U.C.A. § 78-45-7.12 
does not mandate consideration of the statutory factors, a 
departure from the guidelines was plainly justified in this case. 
Utah courts, along with other states, have consistently held that 
a child support award should be entered so as to allow the children 
to experience the same standard of living that they would have 
experienced had there been no divorce. 
In Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983), the Supreme 
Court of Utah upheld a child support award over the defendant's 
objections, noting that the parties and their children "enjoyed a 
very high standard of living during the marriage." Id. at 1205. 
The Savage court considered the ages of the children, their prior 
standard of living, and the defendant's income, and held that 
[w]here a marriage is of long duration and the earning 
capacity of one spouse greatly exceeds that of the other, as 
here, it is appropriate to order alimony and child support at 
a level which will insure that the supported spouse and 
children may maintain a standard of living not unduly 
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disproportionate to that which they would have enjoyed had the 
marriage continued. 
Id, at 1205 (emphasis added). 
Here, considerable evidence was presented at trial regarding 
the parties1 standard of living during their marriage, a lifestyle 
that included considerable travel, recreational opportunities, and 
private education for their son. Should the parties have remained 
married, in all probability their son would have continued to enjoy 
these opportunities. However, it is highly unlikely, and very 
difficult to imagine how Miles may continue such a lifestyle on a 
child support award of $669.00 per month. The trial court erred by 
entering a child support award which is inadequate to allow the 
parties' minor son to experience the same standard of living that 
he would have experienced had there been no divorce. 
IV. 
THE COURT'S ORDER REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES DOES NOT ADDRESS THE 
CONSIDERATIONS REQUIRED BY UTAH LAW 
The trial court ordered the parties to bear their own attorney 
fees. This order does not conform to the requirements of Utah law, 
which compels consideration of the parties' need and ability to pay 
for attorney fees. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 allows a court in a divorce action to 
order a party to pay the attorney fees of the other party. In Bell 
v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct.App. 1991), this Court listed the 
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factors to be considered in determining the propriety of an 
attorney fee award. "The award must be based on evidence of the 
financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other 
spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees." Id. 
at 493. 
In determining reasonableness of the requested fees, a court 
may consider "the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of 
the attorneys, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on 
the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality, the amount 
involved in the case and the result attained, and the expertise and 
experience of the attorneys involved." Id., at 493-94. 
Noticeably absent from the trial court's decision in the 
present case is any consideration of the Bell factors. The court 
merely stated that "plaintiff has sufficient monetary assets based 
on the property division" to pay her attorney fees. (Exhibit A, if 
15). The court did not address Ms. Penrose's other debts, 
including debts to her father which total $75,338.61 exclusive of 
legal fees advanced by Mr. Hansen, her lack of employment, or the 
fact that Mr. Penrose has a significant monthly income and limited 
expenses, which would enable him to bear the cost of Ms. Penrose's 
fees without substantial difficulty. 
Nor did the court mention the reasonableness of the fees 
requested, despite the fact that considerable evidence was 
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presented at trial on this issue. The Bell court remanded a 
similar holding, noting "the court's failure to address Wife's need 
or Husband's ability to pay h€>r attorney fees leaves us with no 
adequate explanation for the court's award." Ld. at 494. The 
trial court abused its discretion by requiring Ms. Penrose to bear 
her own attorney fees without considering the requisite factors. 
[See me on the most recent case and how to deal with it.] 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion in setting an award of 
alimony which fails to realize the goals of alimony under Utah law. 
The award fails for two reasons. It fails to allow Ms. Penrose to 
maintain the same standard of living she enjoyed during her 
marriage, and it fails to equalize the parties' disposable income. 
The trial court's division of debts and property is 
inequitable. The court required both parties to repay debts to 
family members, but granted only Mr. Penrose an asset with which to 
do so. The valuation of the property awarded is erroneous; the 
Certificate of Deposit awarded Mr. Penrose was valued at only 
$29,000.00, despite its face value of $69,000.00, and the parties' 
business was valued at $0, despite its history of steady growth and 
increasing income and a finding of the Court to support that 
conclusion. 
27 
The child support award is inadequate in light of Mr. 
Penrose's established monthly income of $8,932.00 per month, and 
the parties' combined income of $11,032.00 per month, which exceeds 
the statutory guidelines. 
Finally, the court erred in requiring the parties to bear 
their own attorney fees without considering the factors required by 
Utah law; specifically, Ms. Penrose's need, Mr. Penrose's ability 
to pay, or the reasonableness of the fees. 
Ms. Penrose requests an award of attorneys fees and costs 
incurred in this appeal. 
DATED this June, 1996. 
CAMPBELLMAACK & SESSIONS 
CLARK W. SESSIONS 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN 
KRISTINE EDDE 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Karen Penrose 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KAREN PENROSE, 
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JEFFREY HALES, 
Defendant/Appellee. Case No. 93490224DA 
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EXHIBIT A 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 
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Tab A 
ELLEN MAYCOCK - 2131 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034 
Telephone: (801)531-7090 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN PENROSE, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
JEFFREY PENROSE, ] 
Defendant. ] 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 93 490 2224 
Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
1 Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial on June 14, 15, and 22, 1995. 
Plaintiff was present and represented by her counsel, Clark W. Sessions, and defendant was 
present and represented by his counsel, Ellen Maycock. The Honorable Sandra N. Peuler 
presided. At the time of trial, the parties recited their stipulation concerning custody and 
visitation. The court then heard evidence concerning the granting of the divorce, the amount and 
duration of alimony, income of the parties to be used for purposes of calculating child support 
and alimony, property division, and attorneys' fees. The court heard the testimony of witnesses, 
received exhibits, and heard arguments of counsel. The court thereafter made a minute entry 
OCT t 8 fags 
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dated August 9, 1995. Based on the foregoing, and good cause appearing, the court now makes 
and enters the following: 
Findings of Fact 
1. Residence. Plaintiff and defendant were bona fide residents of Salt Lake County, 
Utah, for more than three months prior to the filing of this action. 
2. Marriage. Plaintiff and defendant are wife and husband, having been married on 
August 24, 1982, in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
3. Grounds for Divorce. During the marriage, the parties had arguments that 
resulted in their separation and ultimately resulted in irreconcilable differences that made the 
continuation of the marriage impossible. A decree of divorce should be granted to both parties. 
The decree should be final on entry. 
4. Custody and Visitation. The parties have stipulated and the court finds that it is 
appropriate for the parties to be awarded joint legal custody of their minor child, Miles Penrose, 
with primary physical custody to be awarded to plaintiff. Defendant should be entitled to visit 
with the minor child on every other weekend, every Tuesday overnight, and on alternating 
Thursdays overnight. 
Holiday visitation should be exercised pursuant to the Utah Uniform Visitation Schedule 
as set forth at UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-35. Holidays should take precedence over weekend 
visitation, and changes should not be made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend 
visitation schedule. If a holiday visit by defendant falls on a regularly scheduled school day, 
defendant should be responsible for the child's attendance at school for that school day. If a 
holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday, and the total holiday period extends 
beyond that time so that the child is free from school when the parent is free from work, 
defendant should be entitled to the lengthier holiday period. Holidays should be exercised as 
follows: 
(a) In years ending in an odd number, defendant should be entitled to the 
following holidays: 
(1) Miles' birthday on the day before or after the actual birth date 
beginning at 3:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m.; 
(2) Human Rights Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(3) Easter holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday before the holiday 
until Sunday at 7:00 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a longer period of time to 
which defendant should be completely entitled; 
(4) Memorial Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. Friday until Monday at 7:00 
p.m., unless the holiday extends for a longer period of time to which defendant 
should be completely entitled; 
(5) July 24th holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(6) Veterans Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; and 
(7) The first portion of the Christmas school vacation. "Christmas 
School Vacation" is defined as beginning on the evening the child gets out of 
school for the Christmas school break until the evening before the child returns to 
school, except for Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, and New Year's Day. This 
visitation should include Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1:00 p.m., and 
Christmas School Vacation should be equally divided. 
(b) In years ending in an even number, defendant should be entitled to the 
following holidays: 
(1) The child's birthday on his actual birth date beginning at 3:00 p.m. 
until 9:00 p.m.; 
(2) New Year's Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(3) Presidents' Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(4) July 4th holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(5) Labor Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7:00 
p.m., unless the holiday extends for a longer period of time to which defendant 
should be completely entitled; 
(6) Fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as UEA 
weekend, beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7:00 p.m., unless 
the holiday extends for a longer period of time to which defendant should be 
completely entitled; 
(7) Columbus Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(8) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday before the holiday at 
7:00 p.m. until Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; and 
(9) The second portion of the Christmas School Vacation, as defined 
above, plus Christmas Day beginning at 1:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m., again so long 
as the entire Christmas School Vacation is equally divided between the parties. 
(c) Father's Day should be spent with defendant every year beginning at 9:00 
a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(d) Mother's Day should be spent with plaintiff every year beginning at 9:00 
a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(e) Each of the parties should have the right to have Miles on their own 
birthdays from 3:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. 
Defendant should be awarded four weeks of visitation during the summer or one-half of 
"off track" periods if the minor child is in year round school. Each party should be entitled to at 
least two weeks of uninterrupted time with Miles for the purpose of vacations and other 
activities. Each party should give at least thirty days notice of his or her intent to exercise this 
uninterrupted time with Miles. The uninterrupted vacation time may occur at any time during 
the year, so long as it does not interfere with Miles' school schedule. 
Defendant should have reasonable telephone visitation. 
Further, the parties have stipulated and the court finds that it is appropriate that neither 
party should have the child in his or her presence overnight in their residence in the presence of a 
guest of the opposite sex to whom they are not married or related. 
The pick up and return of the minor child for visitation should be curbside. Neither party 
should enter the residence of the other party. 
Defendant should provide to plaintiff has much notice as possible of any time when he 
will not exercise visitation at a scheduled time. In the event that plaintiff travels out of town, she 
should offer defendant the opportunity to care for the parties' child before obtaining surrogate 
care. 
All clothing and personal effects of the minor child provided by plaintiff for visitation 
periods should be returned by defendant at the end of the visitation period. 
If visitation is exercised overnight, defendant shall prepare the minor child for school the 
next morning or notify plaintiff whether he will deliver the child to school. 
5. Incomes of the Parties. Plaintiff is 34 years old and a high school graduate. She 
had one year of post high school study in Art and History. She has no other formal training or 
education. Prior to her marriage, plaintiff worked as a secretary in her father's business for a 
brief period of time and operated her own business, a balloon greeting business. Plaintiff has 
skills developed during her involvement with the parties' businesses throughout the marriage, 
including hiring and training personnel, payroll, sales, and purchasing. Plaintiff worked 
extensively in the parties' business which they established and operated in Hawaii immediately 
following their marriage. She was also employed at Designers Carpet Showroom, the parties' 
current business. Due to her pregnancy and the birth of her child, she has only worked 
periodically at that business. She has not been employed in any way from the time of the parties' 
separation in May of 1993, to the time of trial. 
Plaintiffs health is good. Although she had a surgical procedure planned, the same 
surgery was recommended to her six years ago following the birth of her child and she elected 
not to have surgery at that time. There is no evidence that there was any condition relating to 
plaintiffs health that would interfere with her ability to obtain employment. The parties' child 
Miles will begin kindergarten this fall and will be out of the home for one-half day during the 
school year. 
Connie Romboy, a vocational evaluator, testified. That testimony indicated that with 
plaintiffs skills, she could obtain employment with an hourly wage ranging from approximately 
$4.50 to $7.40 per hour. Based on plaintiffs experience in business management, Ms. Romboy 
testified that plaintiff should expect a wage in the higher portion of that range. 
Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs health, her age, her abilities and skills, the court finds 
that plaintiff is able to work on a full time basis at approximately $7.00 per hour ($1,200 gross 
per month). If plaintiff were fully employed, she could contribute approximately $900 net per 
month to her own living expenses and needs. Further, prior to her marriage, plaintiff received 
stock from her family during the marriage and continuing to the present. Plaintiff has received 
regular income from that stock on a monthly basis. Although the amount has fluctuated, plaintiff 
presently receives about $900 per month. 
During the parties' marriage, they had a lavish lifestyle. They traveled both in and out of 
the United States, were able to give one another expensive gifts of jewelry, clothing, and furs, 
and they owned luxury cars and expensive homes. Much of the parties' lifestyle was financed by 
plaintiffs parents, who gave the parties money, paid for trips, and provided all their financial 
living requirements for almost four years during their marriage. At the time the parties married, 
neither party was employed. They traveled to Hawaii in October 1992, where they lived in a 
beach front condominium owned by plaintiffs parents for approximately three and one-half 
years. During this period, they paid no rent or mortgage payments, no utilities, no taxes, and no 
insurance. Plaintiffs parents paid all of those expenses. Plaintiffs parents also furnished a 
vehicle to the parties, which was maintained and for which gas and oil was provided at no cost to 
the parties. The parties were able to concentrate all of their energy and resources on developing a 
jet ski rental business in Hawaii. During the first part of their marriage, based on the plaintiffs 
parents financing their living expenses, the parties were able to build a financially successful 
business, ultimately selling the business at a profit and able to save a large sum of money. 
When the parties returned to Utah, both the proceeds from the sale of their business and 
money saved from the profits of the business were used to purchase the first of the parties' 
homes and luxury cars. During the continuation of the marriage, plaintiffs parents continued to 
provide gifts and other financial assistance to the parties that allowed them to maintain a lifestyle 
beyond what they could have afforded by their own efforts. The parties' lifestyle greatly 
exceeded the income actually derived from their businesses. Both parties also testified that, in 
recent years, in their marriage, they had spent everything they earned and had not set anything 
aside as savings. 
Defendant's income, including salary and benefits from the parties' business, from 1991 
through 1994, averaged approximately $126,000 per year based on the expert testimony of Steve 
Nicolatus. During those years, the parties expended the average sum of $126,000 on themselves. 
However, during that same time period, 1991 through 1993, the parties had failed to properly pay 
sales tax from their business profits to the extent of approximately $46,000 per year. If that 
amount had been appropriately deducted, the parties' income from their business, Designers 
Carpet Showroom, would have averaged closer to $80,000 per year. It is clear that the parties 
spent more money than that on themselves; however, it is appropriate to deduct the legally 
required sales tax in order to arrive at a true picture of the business income for those years. In 
1994, defendant's income from Designers Carpet Showroom from salary and benefits was 
$107,188, based on the testimony of the parties' expert, Steve Nicolatus. Sales tax for 1994 was 
properly deducted and paid by the business. Payment of worker's compensation premiums may 
affect defendant's income in the future. However, at the time of trial, defendant had not been 
required to make those payments and the amount required was disputed. Therefore, the court has 
not offset any amount for worker's compensation. 
Since 1990, Designers Carpet Showroom has experienced consistent growth. Gross sales 
have increased approximately 19% per year through 1994. Given the income the parties were 
legally entitled to receive through 1993, after offsets for sales tax, and given that growth, the 
1994 income is not inconsistent with historical income. Based on that evidence, the court finds 
that the appropriate nitoint 101 purposes of calailatifijj ilnld support and jliiiiuJiy is defendant's 
1994 income of $ 107,188, or an average of $8,932 per month. 
6. Child Support. Based on plaintiffs gross monthly income from stock dividends 
and her ability to ea i n an ad iitional $1,2:00 per month gross income, her income for purposes of 
calculating child support is $2,100 per month. Based on defendant's income of $8,932 per 
month, defendant should pay base child support to plaintiff for the benefit of the parties' minor 
child in the sum of $669 per month. Child support should be paid one-half on the fifth day and 
one-half on the twentieth day of each month, effective upon entry of the decree of divorce. Child 
support should continue inilil I he parties' child reaches the a)j,e of eighteen or graduates from 
high school in the normal course, whichever last occurs. 
7. Child Care Expenses. Defendant should be ordered to pay one-half of any future 
work-related or career training eh ild cai e expenses actually incurred by plaintiff 
8. Income Withholding. It is not necessary for the court to implement immediate 
withholding of child support pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-11-501 based oi I defendant's 
voluntary and timely payment of child support. However, if defendant falls thirty or more days 
in arrears in his child support obligation, plaintiff should be entitled to immediate mandatory 
income withholding relief pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-1 I 10! 
9. Alimony. The court's findings as to plaintiffs and defendant's incomes are set 
forth in paragraph 5 above. As to plaintiffs expenses, plaintiffs reasonable living expenses are 
approximatch $ K^IM) per mnnlli. Huth parties claimed excessive expenses which their incomes 
will not support. In part, this is based on the lifestyle they enjoyed during their marriage, which 
was financed not only by the parties' own income from their businesses, but sininj.'s accrued 
from their Ilawaiian business, and by plaintiffs parents who assisted with the parties' ability to 
enjoy an extravagant lifestyle. As to plaintiffs stated monthly expenses, she presently pays no 
real property taxes or insurance on the residence in which she resides. She is renting that home 
from her father and she testified that she pays rent when she is able to do so. Defendant further 
testified and the court finds credible that plaintiffs father pays for the maintenance on the home. 
Plaintiff currently p.ns nu medical 01 denial insurance pn-nuuin », and the court hulliei finds that 
her telephone expense and other expenses, such as entertainment, grooming, installment 
payments, and income taxes, are excessive. 
should be ordered to pay alimony to plaintiff in the sum of $1,331 per month, to commence upon 
entry of the decree of divorce. Alimony should be paid one-half on the fifth day and one-half on 
the twentieth day of each month. Further, based on the duration of the parties' marriage, the 
length of time that plaintiff has been out of the job market, and the parties' disparate abilities to 
marriage consistent with UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5. Alimony should terminate upon plaintiffs 
remarriage, cohabitation, or death, or upon further order of the court, or at the expiration of 
thirteen years from the date of the trial herein, June 15, 1995, whichever first occurs. 
10. Restraining Order. Both parties should be permanently enjoined from harassing, 
annoying, or threatening the other, and from making any derogatory remarks about the other in 
the presence of their minor child. 
11. Health Insurance. Defendant should be ordered to maintain health and medical 
insurance for the benefit of the parties' minor child w itli a deductible a moi ml: no greater than 
$500 In the event that defendant wishes to maintain health and medical insurance for the child 
with a deductible greater than $500, he should be solely responsible for the payment of any 
additional deduct il >k costs incurred Consistent w itli I J I AI I CODE ANN. § 78-45-7 15, each party 
should pay one-half of the out-of-pocket cost of the premium actually paid for the child's portion 
III! ihr health insuunu' I irli pam should In1 nntnvd in |ia\ one-hall ril all tcdsuiubl) and 
necessary uninsured medical expenses, including copayments and deductibles, incurred for the 
parties' minor child. 
12. Preschool Tuition. The parties agreed at the time of their separation to share 
equally the cost of minor child's private preschool tuition. Defendant has not paid his entire 
share and should pay the amount of $564 to plaintiff, represeiitiiig the balance < if his share of 
those costs. 
13 Property Division: 
(a) Designers Carpet Showroom. During the pai ties' man iage, they 
purchased and operated a business known as Designers Carpet Showroom. Based on the 
testimony of the expert witness jointly engaged by the parties, Steve Nicolatus, the fair 
market value ol that business is $194,000, Oie I Jtah State Tax Commission has assessed 
$213,000 against the business based on the parties' failure to remit sales taxes for the 
years 1991 through 1993. Defendant testified th;i1 lie expects to i»e able to irdua1 tiuf 
amount by approximately $30,000 through negotiation or through providing evidence to 
the Tax Commission that certain designers have paid sales tax on the transactions at 
issue In addition, there has been, assessed against the hi i siness a 1 \ orker's compensation 
premium payment, the amount of which is presently in dispute. Based on the foregoing, 
the court finds that the value of the business is approximately $194,000, and the debts 
ow eel b> the bi isiness are approximately the same amount. The court awards Designers 
Carpet Showroom to defendant. Thus, although the business is valued at zero for 
purposes of distributing the parties' property, the coi irt finds that it has significant \ alue 
as evidenced by historical and present earnings. Defendant will have the ability to pay 
the indebtedness and continue to earn income consistent with the pattern of historical 
earnings and business growth. 
(b) Utah Water Sports. Defendant testified that he obtained a 40% interest in 
the business based on his initial investment in the sum of $12,000. The $12,000 was 
marital funds generated from the business owned by the parties. Because the court is not 
able to determine the present value of the 40% interest, the court concludes that the 
interest in Utah Water Sports should be divided between the parties equally. 
(c) Key Bank Certificate of Deposit. The parties own a Key Bank certificate 
of deposit with a current value of approximately $69,000. Defendant pledged that 
certificate of deposit to secure the Utah Water Sports line of credit to allow Utah Water 
Sports to purchase inventory. Forty thousand dollars of that amount was borrowed from 
defendant's grandmother and should be returned to defendant so that he can repay that 
loan. The balance, approximately $29,000, is awarded to defendant. 
(d) Furniture and Furnishings. The parties divided their furniture at the time 
they separated. Plaintiff has valued items she took at $18,000, while defendant values the 
same items at $25,000. Defendant retained a portion of the furniture and furnishings, 
although he testified their value was minimal. On the other hand, plaintiff testified that 
defendant's furniture had a value of approximately $34,000. Based on the parties' 
testimony and a review of the list of items provided in defendant's exhibits, the court 
concludes that each party received approximately $25,000 in value in furniture and 
furnishings and those items should be retained by the party who presently has them. 
Further, both parties received gifts of jewelry from the other, and each party should be 
awarded those items. 
(e) Vehicles. Defendant has in his possession a Bronco with a value of 
approximately $8,000, two snowmobiles valued at $13,000, a trailer for the snowmobiles 
valued at $2,000. Those items should be awarded to him. Plaintiff has a BMW which 
she currently leases which should be awarded to her. At the time the parties separated, 
plaintiff had a Mercedes Benz, which she sold or traded in on the BMW. Although 
plaintiff testified that the BMW has no value to her because she cannot purchase the car 
at the end of the lease, the court finds that it has a value of approximately $12,000, since 
a marital asset valued at approximately $12,000 was used to allow her to obtain the 
BMW. 
(f) Bank Accounts. Each party should be awarded his or her respective 
checking account. The furniture account which the parties had prior to their separation 
was used by both parties through May of 1993. At that time, the amount in this account 
was between $4,500 and $6,000. The parties separated in approximately February of 
1993 and a temporary order for child support and alimony was not entered until 
September of that year. Plaintiff testified that she used the balance of the funds in the 
furniture account to provide support for herself and the parties' child. The court finds 
that that use is reasonable and declines to set any value on the account for purposes of 
property distribution. 
(g) Escrowed Funds. The parties have funds in escrow obtained from the sale 
of their marital residence, which sale occurred after their separation. The current balance 
in the account is approximately $178,000. In order to equalize the property distribution, 
the court finds that plaintiff should be awarded from the escrow account the sum of 
$109,000, and defendant should be awarded the sum of $69,000. If the amount of the 
escrow funds is in excess of $178,000, the excess should be equally divided between the 
parties. 
14. Debts and Obligations. Defendant should assume and pay all debts and 
obligations owed in connection with Designers Carpet Showroom. In addition, defendant should 
repay the $40,000 borrowed from his grandmother. Each party should assume and pay any credit 
card debt or loan incurred by him or her during their separation. Plaintiff should be ordered to 
assume and pay all debts owed to her father, which includes in substantial part, the attorneys' 
fees she has incurred in connection with this action. 
15. Attorneys' Fees and Costs. The court finds that plaintiff has sufficient monetary 
assets based on the property division to pay the debt for her attorneys' fees. She should be 
ordered to pay that amount, except the amount defendant was previously ordered to pay by 
temporary order in this matter. 
16. Life Insurance. The court finds that defendant has a life insurance policy with a 
face amount between $300,000 and $350,000. Based on his agreement, the court finds that it is 
reasonable for defendant to name plaintiff and the parties' minor child as beneficiaries of the 
policy for the time periods during which he is obligated to pay child support and alimony. 
17. Motion To Seal File. Plaintiffs motion to seal the file should be granted. 
18. Tra Provisions: 
(a) Defendant should be awarded the right to claim the minor child of the 
parties as an exemption for federal and state income tax purposes. In the event that 
plaintiff obtains employment and child support is adjusted, the court shall reconsider the 
award of this tax exemption. 
(b) In the event any joint income tax return of the parties is audited or 
amended, defendant should be solely liable for the payment of any additional tax, penalty, 
or interest assessed, or should be awarded any refund. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the court now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court has jurisdiction over the parties of this action and the subject matter of 
this action. 
2. Each party is entitled to a decree of divorce from the other party on grounds of 
irreconcilable differences. 
3. The decree of divorce should conform to the foregoing findings of fact. 
DATED this / & day of October, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
QOf^^0*-^^ 
JUDGE SANDRA N. PEULER 
Approved as to form: 
A 
CLARK W. SESSIONS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
''UaoAY) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following, postage prepaid, this \~b day of 
October, 1995: 
Clark W. Sessions, Esq. 
Campbell, Maack & Sessions 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
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Telephone: (801)531-7090 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN PENROSE, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
V S . j 
JEFFREY PENROSE, ] 
Defendant. ) 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
> Civil No. 93 490 2224 
Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
1 Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial on June 14, 15, and 22, 1995. 
Plaintiff was present and represented by her counsel, Clark W. Sessions, and defendant was 
present and represented by his counsel, Ellen Maycock. The Honorable Sandra N. Peuler 
presided. At the time of trial, the parties recited their stipulation concerning custody and 
visitation. The court then heard evidence concerning the granting of the divorce, the amount and 
duration of alimony, income of the parties to be used for purposes of calculating child support 
and alimony, property division, and attorneys' fees. The court heard the testimony of witnesses, 
received exhibits, and heard arguments of counsel. The court thereafter made a minute entry 
ThW Judicial Df*W«t 
OCT 1 8 1995 
HALT IAKS COUNTY 
Depu:/ C\ir\ 
dated August 9, 1995. Based on the foregoing, and the court having made and entered its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IF IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 
DECREED as follows: 
1. Decree of Divorce. Each party is granted a decree of divorce from the other party 
on grounds of irreconcilable differences and decree will be final upon signing and entry. 
2. Custody and Visitation. Plaintiff and defendant are awarded joint legal custody of 
their minor child, Miles Penrose, with primary physical custody to be awarded to plaintiff. 
Defendant is entitled to visitation with the minor child on every other weekend, every Tuesday 
overnight, and on alternating Thursdays overnight. 
Holiday visitation shall be exercised pursuant to the Utah Uniform Visitation Schedule as 
set forth at UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-35. Holidays shall take precedence over weekend 
visitation, and changes shall not be made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend 
visitation schedule. If a holiday visit by defendant falls on a regularly scheduled school day, 
defendant shall be responsible for the child's attendance at school for that school day. If a 
holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday, and the total holiday period extends 
beyond that time so that the child is free from school when the parent is free from work, 
defendant is entitled to the lengthier holiday period. Holidays shall be exercised as follows: 
(a) In years ending in an odd number, defendant is entitled to the following 
holidays: 
(1) Miles' birthday on the day before or after the actual birth date 
beginning at 3:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m.; 
(2) Human Rights Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(3) Easter holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday before the holiday 
until Sunday at 7:00 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a longer period of time to 
which defendant is completely entitled; 
(4) Memorial Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. Friday until Monday at 7:00 
p.m., unless the holiday extends for a longer period of time to which defendant is 
completely entitled; 
(5) July 24th holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(6) Veterans Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; and 
(7) The first portion of the Christmas school vacation. "Christmas 
School Vacation" is defined as beginning on the evening the child gets out of 
school for the Christmas school break until the evening before the child returns to 
school, except for Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, and New Year's Day. This 
visitation should include Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1:00 p.m., and 
Christmas School Vacation shall be equally divided. 
(b) In years ending in an even number, defendant is entitled to the following 
holidays: 
(1) The child's birthday on his actual birth date beginning at 3:00 p.m. 
until 9:00 p.m.; 
(2) New Year's Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(3) Presidents' Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(4) July 4th holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(5) Labor Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7:00 
p.m., unless the holiday extends for a longer period of time to which defendant is 
completely entitled; 
(6) Fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as UEA 
weekend, beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7:00 p.m., unless 
the holiday extends for a longer period of time to which defendant is completely 
entitled; 
(7) Columbus Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(8) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday before the holiday at 
7:00 p.m. until Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; and 
(9) The second portion of the Christmas School Vacation, as defined 
above, plus Christmas Day beginning at 1:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m., again so long 
as the entire Christmas School Vacation is equally divided between the parties. 
(c) Father's Day shall be spent with defendant every year beginning at 9:00 
a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(d) Mother's Day shall be spent with plaintiff every year beginning at 9:00 
a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(e) Each party shall have the right to have Miles on his or her own birthday 
from 3:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. 
Defendant is awarded four weeks of visitation during the summer or one-half of "off 
track" periods if the minor child is in year round school. Each party is entitled to at least two 
weeks of uninterrupted time with Miles for the purpose of vacations and other activities. Each 
party shall give at least thirty days notice of his or her intent to exercise this uninterrupted time 
with Miles. The uninterrupted vacation time may occur at any time during the year, so long as it 
does not interfere with Miles' school schedule. 
Defendant is awarded reasonable telephone visitation. 
Neither party should have the child in his or her presence overnight in their residence in 
the presence of a guest of the opposite sex to whom they are not married or related. 
The pick up and return of the minor child for visitation shall be curbside. Neither party 
shall enter the residence of the other party. 
Defendant is ordered to provide to plaintiff as much notice as possible of any time when 
he will not exercise visitation at a scheduled time. In the event plaintiff travels our of town, she 
is ordered to offer defendant the opportunity to care for the parties' child before obtaining 
surrogate care. 
Defendant is ordered to return all clothing and personal effects of the minor child 
provided by plaintiff for visitation at the end of the visitation period. 
If visitation is exercised overnight, defendant shall prepare the minor child for school the 
next morning and notify plaintiff whether he will deliver the child to school. 
3. Child Support. Defendant is ordered to pay child support to plaintiff for the 
benefit of the parties' minor child in the sum of $669 per month. Child support shall be paid 
one-half on the fifth day and one-half on the twentieth day of each month, effective upon entry of 
the decree of divorce. Child support shall continue until the parties' child reaches the age of 
eighteen or graduates from high school in the normal course, whichever last occurs. 
4. Child Care Expenses. Defendant is ordered to pay one-half of any future work-
related or career training child care expenses actually incurred by plaintiff. 
5. Income Withholding. It is not necessary for the court to implement immediate 
withholding of child support pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-11-501 based on defendant's 
voluntary and timely payment of child support. However, if defendant falls thirty or more days 
in arrears in his child support obligation, plaintiff is entitled to immediate mandatory income 
withholding relief pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-11-401. 
6. Alimony. Defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff alimony in the sum of $1,331 
per month, to commence upon entry of the decree of divorce. Alimony shall be paid one-half on 
the fifth day and one-half on the twentieth day of each month. The duration of alimony should 
be permanent, but not to exceed the length of the marriage consistent with UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 30-3-5. Alimony shall terminate upon plaintiffs remarriage, cohabitation, or death, or upon 
further order of the court, or at the expiration of thirteen years from the date of the trial herein, 
June 15, 1995, whichever first occurs. 
7. Restraining Order. Both parties are permanently enjoined from harassing, 
annoying, or threatening the other, and from making any derogatory remarks about the other in 
the presence of their minor child. 
8. Health Insurance. Defendant is ordered to maintain health and medical insurance 
for the benefit of the parties' minor child with a deductible amount no greater than $500. In the 
event that defendant wishes to maintain health and medical insurance for the child with a 
deductible greater than $500, defendant shall be solely responsible for payment of any additional 
deductible costs incurred. Consistent with UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.15, each party is ordered 
to pay one-half of the out-of-pocket cost of the premium actually paid for the child's portion of 
the health insurance. Each party is ordered to pay one-half of all reasonably and necessary 
uninsured medical expenses, including copayments and deductibles, incurred for the parties' 
minor child. 
9. Preschool Tuition. Defendant is ordered to pay the amount of $564 to plaintiff, 
representing the balance of his share of the preschool tuition costs. 
10. Property Division: 
(a) Designers Carpet Showroom. Defendant is awarded the business 
Designers Carpet Showroom, free and clear of any claim of plaintiff. 
(b) Utah Water Sports. The interest in Utah Water Sports is awarded to the 
parties equally. 
(c) Key Bank Certificate of Deposit. The Key Bank certificate of deposit 
valued at approximately $69,000 is awarded to defendant, free and clear of any claim of 
plaintiff. 
(d) Furniture and Furnishings. Each party is awarded the furniture, 
furnishings, jewelry, and personal property items presently in his or her possession, free 
and clear of any claim of the other party. 
(e) Vehicles. Defendant is awarded the Bronco, two snowmobiles, and a 
trailer for the snowmobiles, free and clear of any claim of plaintiff. Plaintiff is awarded 
the BMW which she currently leases, free and clear of any claim of defendant. 
(f) Bank Accounts. Each party is awarded his or her respective checking 
account. 
(g) Escrowed Funds. Plaintiff is awarded the sum of $109,000 from the 
escrow account and defendant is awarded the sum of $69,000. If the amount of the 
escrow funds is in excess of $178,000, the excess shall be equally divided between the 
parties. 
11. Debts and Obligations. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all debts and 
obligations owed in connection with Designers Carpet Showroom. In addition, defendant is 
ordered to repay the $40,000 borrowed from his grandmother. Each party is ordered to assume, 
pay, and hold the other party harmless from any credit card debt or loan incurred by him or her 
during their separation. Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay all debts owed to her father, which 
includes in substantial part, the attorneys' fees she has incurred in connection with this action. 
12. Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Each party should pay his or her own attorney's fees 
and costs, except the amount defendant was previously ordered to pay by temporary order in this 
matter. 
13. Life Insurance. Defendant is ordered to maintain his present policy of life 
insurance with a face amount between $300,000 and $350,000, naming plaintiff and the parties' 
minor child as beneficiaries of the policy for the time periods during which he is obligated to pay 
child support and alimony. 
14. Motion To Seal File. Plaintiffs motion to seal the file is granted and the file 
should be sealed in this matter. 
15. Tax Provisions: 
(a) Defendant is awarded the right to claim the minor child of the parties as an 
exemption for federal and state income tax purposes. In the event that plaintiff obtains 
employment and child support is adjusted, the court shall reconsider the award of this tax 
exemption. 
(b) In the event any joint income tax return of the parties is audited or 
amended, defendant shall be solely liable for the payment of any additional tax, penalty, 
or interest assessed, or shall be awarded any refund. 
DATED this \f) day of October, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
iZ f<^i 
\Df^u< 
JUDGE SANDRA N. PEULER 
/' J / 
CLARK W. SESSIONS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing DECREE OF 
DIVORCE to the following, postage prepaid, this \ 3 day of October, 1995: 
Clark W. Sessions, Esq. 
Campbell, Maack & Sessions 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2215 
\ 
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30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Use of affidavit 
— Sealing. 
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the* plaintiff or 
plaintiffs attorney. 
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default or otherwise 
except upon legal evidence taken in the cause. If the decree is to be entered 
upon the default of the defendant, evidence to support the decree may be 
submitted upon the affidavit of the plaintiff with the approval of the court. 
(c) If the plaintiff and the defendant have a child or children and the 
plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial district as defined in Section 
78-1-2.1 where the pilot program shall be administered, a decree of divorce 
may not be granted until both parties have attended a mandatory course 
provided in Section 30-3-11.3 and have presented a certificate of course 
completion to the court. The court may waive this requirement, on its own 
motion or on the motion of one of the parties, if it determines course 
attendance and completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in 
the best interest of the parties. 
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held before the court or 
the court commissioner as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of the 
Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall 
enter the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree after default 
of the defendant, upon the plaintiffs affidavit. 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by order of the court 
upon the motion of either party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the 
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of 
record or attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office of 
Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied for or is receiving 
public assistance, or the court have full access to the entire record. This sealing 
does not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree. 
History: ILS. 1898 & CJL 1907, $ 1211; L. Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
1909, ch. 60, § 1; CJL. 1917, § 2999; R.S. 1933 ment, effective July 1, 1995, added the second 
& C. 1943,40-3-4; L. 1957, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, sentence of Subsection (1Kb) and in the second 
ch. 59, § 1; 1969, ch. 72, § 2; 1983, ch. 116, sentence of Subsection (l)(d) substituted "shall 
§ 1; 1985, ch. 151, § 1; 1989, ch. 104, § 1; enter the decree" for "shall make and file find-
1990, ch. 230, § 1; 1991, ch. 5, § 35; 1992, ch. ings and decree" and added the language begin-
98, § 1; 1992, ch. 290, S 3; 1995, ch. 62, § 1. rung "or, m the case o r at the end. 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Division of 
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — 
Custody and visitation — Determination of ali-
mony — Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
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(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of 
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and 
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after 
January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order 
assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month check processing 
fee to be included in the amount withheld and paid to the OflBce of 
Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services for the 
purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
Parts 4 and 5. 
The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
fning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
Ted on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
aining of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
:es are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
I for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
ing of the custodial parent. 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
Drders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
h, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for 
as is reasonable and necessary. 
(a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
lembers of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best 
iterest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
nforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation 
:hedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
tiforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a 
order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
lable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
urt determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
led against in good faith. 
If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by 
nt, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
u 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the 
the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
ey fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the 
party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation, 
a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
imony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
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(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance 
with Subsection (a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equal-
ize the parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a 
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital 
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's 
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating 
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, 
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at 
the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive 
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial 
material change in circumstances not forseeable at the time of the 
divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for 
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time 
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circum-
stances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse 
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this 
subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial 
ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse 
if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that 
consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number 
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination 
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the 
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights 
are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
COHABITANT ABUSE ACT 30-5-2 
[istoiy: RJ3.1898 & CX. 1907, § 1212; L. 
9, ch. 109, § 4; CX. 1917, § 3000; R.S. 
3 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; 
5, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch. 
8 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1; 
I, ch. 257, § 4; 1993, ch. 152, § 1; 1993, 
261, S 1; 1994, ch. 284, § 1; 1995, ch. 330, 
nendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
t, effective May 1,1995, deleted a provision 
Subsection (3) for support and mainte-
e orders; deleted former Subsections (5) 
(6), providing that alimony terminates 
upon remarriage, or cohabitation with a mem-
ber of the opposite sex, by the payee; added 
Subsections (7) to (9); renumbered former Sub-
sections (7) and (8) as (5) and (6); and made 
stylistic changes. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1995, ch. 330, 
which amended this section, provides in § 2 
that the Legislature does not intend that ter-
mination of alimony based on cohabitation, in 
accordance with Subsection (9), "be interpreted 
in any way to condone such a relationship for 
any purpose." 
CHAPTER 5 
GRANDPARENTS 
>n 
I. Visitation rights of grandparents. 
>-2. Visitation rights of grandparents. 
The district court may grant grandparents reasonable rights of visita-
if it is in the best interest of the grandchildren, in cases where a 
dparent's child has died or has become a noncustodial parent through 
•ce or legal separation. 
Grandparents may petition the court as provided in Section 78-32-12.2 
tnedy a parent's wrongful noncompliance with a visitation order. 
tory: C. 1953, 30-5-2, enacted by L. 
ch. 123, § 2; 1993, ch. 152, § 2; 1995, 
7,§ 1. 
mdment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
sffective May 1,1995, deleted "and other 
immediate family members9 from both subsec-
tions and in Subsection (1) substituted "grand-
children" for "children" and added the clause 
beginning "in cases" to the end. 
CHAPTER 6 
COHABITANT ABUSE ACT 
Definitions. 
Abuse or danger of abuse — Pro-
tective orders. 
Venue of action. 
Forms for petitions and protective 
orders — Assistance. 
Continuing duty to inform court of 
other proceedings — Effect of 
other proceedings. 
Protective orders — Ex parte pro-
tective orders — Modification of 
orders — Duties of the court. 
Hearings on ex parte orders. 
No denial of relief solely because 
of lapse of time. 
Section 
30-6-4.5. Mutual protective orders prohib-
ited. 
30-6-4.6. Prohibition of court-ordered or 
court-referred mediation. 
30-6-4.8. Electronic monitoring of domestic 
violence offenders. 
30-6-5 to 30-6-7. Repealed. 
30-6-8. Statewide domestic violence net-
work — Peace officers1 duties — 
Prevention of abuse in absence 
of order — Limitation of liabil-
ity 
30-6-9, 30-6-10. Repealed. 
30-6-11. Division of Family Services — De-
velopment and assistance of vol-
unteer network. 
78-45-7.10 JUDICIAL CODE 212 
78-45-7.10. Reduction when child becomes 18. 
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age, or has graduated from high school 
during the child's normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs 
later, the base child support award is automatically reduced to reflect the lower 
base combined child support obligation shown in the table for the remaining 
number of children due child support, unless otherwise provided in the child 
support order. 
(2) The award may not be reduced by a per child amount derived from the 
base child support award originally ordered. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.10, enacted by L. graduated from high school during the child's 
1989, ch. 214, § 12; 1994, ch. 118, § 11. normal and expected year of graduation, which-
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- ever occurs later" and deleted "combined" be-
ment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "or has fore "child support award" in Subsection (1). 
78*45-7.11. Reduction for extended visitation. 
(1) The child support order shall provide that the base child support award 
be reduced by 50% for each child for time periods during which the child is with 
the noncustodial parent by order of the court or by written agreement of the 
parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. If the dependent child is a 
recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, any agreement by the 
parties for reduction of child support during extended visitation shall be 
approved by the administrative agency. However, normal visitation and 
holiday visits to the custodial parent shall not be considered an interruption of 
the consecutive day requirement. 
(2) For purposes of this section the per child amount to which the abatement 
applies shall be calculated by dividing the base child support award by the 
number of children included in the award. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.11, enacted by L. of any 30 consecutive days" at the end of the 
1989, ch. 214, § 13; 1990, ch. 100, § 9; 1994, first sentence and substituted the second and 
ch. 118, § 12. third sentences for "Only the base child support 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- award is affected by the 50% abatement. The 
ment, effective July 1, 1994, in Subsection (1), amount to be paid for work related child care 
substituted the language beginning "which the costs may be suspended if the costs are not 
child is" for "which the order grants specific incurred during the extended visitation." 
extended visitation for that child for at least 25 
78-45-7.12. Income in excess of tables. 
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the highest level specified in 
the table, an appropriate and just child support amount shall be ordered on a 
case-by-case basis, but the amount ordered may not be less than the highest 
level specified in the table for the number of children due support. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.12, enacted by L. ment, effective July 1,1994, substituted "shall" 
1989, ch. 214, § 14; 1994, ch. 118, § 13. for "may" and inserted "on a case-by-case ba-
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- sis." 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Baker v Baker, 866 R2d 540 (Utah 
CtApp 1993) 
78-45-7.13. Advisory committee — Membership and func-
tions. 
(1) On or before March 1, 1995, and every fourth year subsequently, the 
governor shall appoint an advisory committee consisting of: 
(a) two representatives recommended by the Office of Recovery Ser-
vices; 
(b) two representatives recommended by the Judicial Council; 
(c) two representatives recommended by the Utah State Bar Associa-
tion; and 
(d) an uneven number of additional persons, not to exceed five, who 
represent diverse interests related to child support issues, as the governor 
may consider appropriate. However, none of the individuals appointed 
under this subsection may be members of the Utah State Bar Association. 
(2) (a) The advisory committee shall review the child support guidelines to 
ensure their application results in the determination of appropriate child 
support award amounts. 
(b) The committee shall report to the Legislative Judiciary Interim 
Committee on or before October 1 in 1989 and 1991, and then on or before 
October 1 of every fourth year subsequently. 
(c) The committee's report shall include recommendations of the major-
ity of the committee, as well as specific recommendations of individual 
members of the committee. 
(3) The committee members serve without compensation. Staff for the 
>mmittee shall be provided from the existing budgets of the Department of 
uman Services and the Judicial Council. The committee ceases to exist no 
ter than the date the subsequent committee under this section is appointed. 
history: C. 1953,78-45-7.13, enacted by L. "March 1, 1995" for "May 1, 1989 and May 1, 
39, ch. 214, § 15; 1990, ch. 183, § 58; 1994, 1991" and deleted "then on or before May 1 o f 
118, § 14. before "every fourth year" in the introductory 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- language of Subsection (1). 
nt, effective July 1, 1994, substituted 
-45-7.14. Base combined child support obligation table 
and low income table. 
Tie following includes the Base Combined Child Support Obligation Table 
i the Low Income Table: 
BASE COMBINED CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION TABLE 
(Both Parents) 
tthly Combined 
Gross Income Number of Children 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
rom To 
650 — 675 99 184 191 198 200 201 
Monthly Combined 
Adj. Gross Income 
1 2 
From 
676 
701 
726 
751 
776 
801 
826 
851 
876 
901 
926 
951 
976 
1,001 
1,051 
1,101 
1,151 
1,201 
1,251 
1,301 
1,351 
1,401 
1,451 
1,501 
1,551 
1,601 
1,651 
1,701 
1,751 
1,801 
1,851 
1,901 
1,951 
2,001 
2,101 
2,201 
2,301 
2,401 
2,501 
2,601 
2,701 
2,801 
2,901 
3,001 
3,101 
3,201 
3,301 
3,401 
lb 
— 700 
— 725 
— 750 
— 775 
— 800 
— 825 
— 850 
— 875 
— 900 
— 925 
— 950 
— 975 
— 1,000 
— 1,050 
— 1,100 
— 1,150 
— 1,200 
— 1,250 
— 1,300 
— 1,350 
— 1,400 
— 1,450 
— 1,500 
— 1,550 
— 1,600 
— 1,650 
— 1,700 
— 1,750 
— 1,800 
— 1,850 
— 1,900 
— 1,950 
— 2,000 
— 2,100 
— 2,200 
— 2,300 
— 2,400 
— 2,500 
— 2,600 
— 2,700 
— 2,800 
— 2,900 
— 3,000 
— 3,100 
— 3,200 
— 3,300 
— 3,400 
— 3,500 
103 
106 
110 
113 
117 
121 
124 
128 
132 
135 
139 
143 
146 
154 
161 
168 
176 
183 
190 
198 
205 
212 
220 
227 
234 
242 
249 
256 
264 
271 
278 
286 
293 
308 
319 
328 
336 
345 
354 
362 
371 
380 
388 
397 
406 
414 
423 
431 
190 
197 
204 
211 
218 
224 
231 
238 
245 
251 
258 
265 
272 
285 
299 
313 
326 
340 
353 
367 
381 
394 
408 
421 
435 
449 
462 
476 
489 
503 
517 
530 
544 
571 
592 
608 
625 
641 
658 
674 
691 
707 
724 
740 
756 
773 
789 
804 
214 
Number of Children 
3 4 5 6 
198 
205 
212 
219 
226 
243 
253 
263 
274 
284 
294 
305 
315 
335 
356 
377 
387 
403 
418 
433 
448 
463 
478 
493 
509 
524 
539 
554 
569 
584 
597 
610 
622 
643 
666 
687 
708 
725 
746 
767 
788 
809 
830 
851 
872 
893 
914 
934 
205 
212 
220 
227 
234 
261 
275 
289 
303 
316 
330 
344 
358 
385 
413 
441 
449 
465 
482 
499 
515 
532 
549 
565 
582 
599 
615 
632 
649 
664 
677 
690 
700 
716 
741 
766 
791 
809 
834 
859 
885 
910 
936 
962 
987 
1,013 
1,039 
1,064 
207 
214 
221 
229 
236 
263 
277 
291 
305 
319 
333 
347 
361 
389 
417 
444 
454 
475 
496 
516 
537 
558 
579 
600 
620 
641 
662 
683 
704 
723 
736 
750 
752 
779 
807 
835 
862 
882 
909 
937 
964 
992 
1,020 
1,048 
1,076 
1,103 
1,131 
1,159 
209 
216 
223 
231 
238 
265 
279 
294 
308 
322 
336 
350 
364 
393 
421 
449 
460 
484 
508 
532 
556 
580 
605 
629 
653 
677 
701 
725 
749 
771 
786 
800 
813 
833 
862 
891 
921 
942 
972 
1,001 
1,031 
1,060 
1,090 
1,120 
1,149 
1,179 
1,208 
1,238 
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Monthly Combined 
Adj. Gross Income 
From To 
3,501 — 3,600 
3,601 — 3,700 
3,701 — 3,800 
3,801 — 3,900 
3,901 — 4,000 
4,001 — 4,100 
4,101 — 4,200 
4,201 — 4,300 
4,301 — 4,400 
4,401 — 4,500 
4,501 — 4,600 
4,601 — 4,700 
4,701 — 4,800 
4,801 — 4,900 
4,901 — 5,000 
5,001 — 5,100 
5,101 — 5,200 
5,201 — 5,300 
5,301 — 5,400 
5,401 — 5,500 
5,501 — 5,600 
5,601 — 5,700 
5,701 — 5,800 
5,801 — 5,900 
5,901 — 6,000 
6,001 — 6,100 
6,101 — 6,200 
6,201 — 6,300 
6,301 — 6,400 
6,401 — 6,500 
6,501 — 6,600 
6,601 — 6,700 
6,701 — 6,800 
6,801 — 6,900 
6,901 — 7,000 
7,001 — 7,100 
7,101 — 7,200 
7,201 — 7,300 
7,301 — 7,400 
7,401 — 7,500 
7,501 — 7,600 
7,601 — 7,700 
7,701 — 7,800 
7,801 - 7,900 
7,901 — 8,000 
8,001 — 8,100 
8,101 — 8,200 
8,201 — 8,300 
1 2 
438 
444 
451 
458 
465 
472 
479 
486 
493 
499 
506 
513 
520 
527 
534 
541 
547 
554 
561 
568 
575 
582 
586 
591 
596 
601 
605 
610 
615 
620 
624 
629 
629 
673 
680 
687 
694 
701 
706 
710 
715 
719 
723 
728 
732 
737 
741 
746 
817 
830 
843 
856 
870 
883 
896 
909 
923 
936 
949 
962 
975 
989 
1,002 
1,015 
1,028 
1,042 
1,055 
1,068 
1,081 
1,093 
1,103 
1,112 
1,122 
1,131 
1,141 
1,150 
1,159 
1,169 
1,178 
1,188 
1,188 
1,188 
1,188 
1,188 
1,188 
1,188 
1,189 
1,197 
1,205 
1,213 
1,220 
1,228 
1,236 
1,244 
1,252 
1,259 
Number of Chil< 
3 4 
953 
973 
992 
1,012 
1,031 
1,050 
1,069 
1,088 
1,107 
1,131 
1,150 
1,169 
1,188 
1,207 
1,226 
1,245 
1,264 
1,282 
1,300 
1,317 
1,335 
1,351 
1,367 
1,383 
1,398 
1,414 
1,430 
1,445 
1,461 
1,480 
1,495 
1,511 
1,511 
1,511 
1,511 
1,511 
1,511 
1,520 
1,531 
1,541 
1,551 
1,562 
1,572 
1,582 
1,592 
1,603 
1,613 
1,623 
1,090 
1,116 
1,141 
1,167 
1,192 
1,217 
1,242 
1,267 
1,292 
1,326 
1,350 
1,375 
1,400 
1,425 
1,450 
1,475 
1,500 
1,522 
1,544 
1,566 
1,588 
1,610 
1,632 
1,653 
1,675 
1,697 
1,719 
1,740 
1,762 
1,791 
1,812 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,841 
1,853 
5 6 
1,187 
1,215 
1,243 
1,270 
1,297 
1,325 
1,352 
1,379 
1,407 
1,443 
1,470 
1,498 
1,525 
1,552 
1,580 
1,607 
1,634 
1,658 
1,682 
1,706 
1,730 
1,754 
1,778 
1,802 
1,826 
1,850 
1,874 
1,897 
1,921 
1,951 
1,975 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
2,000 
2,013 
2,026 
2,039 
1,268 
1,297 
1,327 
1,356 
1,386 
1,415 
1,444 
1,474 
1,503 
1,541 
1,570 
1,600 
1,629 
1,658 
1,687 
1,717 
1,746 
1,772 
1,797 
1,823 
1,848 
1,874 
1,899 
1,925 
1,950 
1,976 
2,001 
2,026 
2,052 
2,084 
2,109 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,137 
2,150 
2,164 
2,178 
2,192 
l O 
<N 
bi
ne
c 
co
m
e 
R s 6" 
W
 CO 
th
ly
 
G
ro
 
a • o;ff S<! 
s 
o 
« O ^ ^ H I 0 0 5 C O N O ^ Q O ( N C £ ) O ^ I > H 
0 ( N C O ^ < O N O O O H C 0 ^ 1 0 I > O O O H ( N ^ 
N W N (N (N N (N CO CO CO CO CO CO CO ^ ^ Tf xj< 
of of of of of of of of of of of of of of of of of of 
W ^ t ^ O C O C £ > C ^ H T t < ^ O C O C O C O H ^ l > 0 
W C O l > 0 5 0 H ( N ^ U 5 « O a ) 0 5 0 H C O ^ l O ^ 
O O O O H *-"t»-H rH »~l»-l»-l»-lCNI^O^O^O^OiO^ 
of of of of of of of of of of of of of of of of of of 
^ C 0 0 0 5 H ( N ^ l O t - 0 ) 0 < N C O l O I > C O O H 
C O t ^ C O O ) H ( N C O ^ l O C O C O O i O H C S | C O l O C O 
00 00 00 00 CJ^ CB ^ l ^ ^ l ^ ^ l 0 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
r-f T-T r-f r-4 r-f r-T r-f i-f i-T r-f T-T i-f o f o f o f o f o f o f 
C O T t < T * « T * < l O i O l O i O < 0 < O C O t > ! > I > I > O O O O O O 
C O ^ I O C O I > 0 0 0 5 0 H < N C O ^ I O C O ^ C 0 0 5 0 
C O Q O C O C O C O C 0 C O I > t > ! > l > t > I > I > t > l > l > a O 
M O C 0 H 0 0 C 0 ^ ( N O M O C 0 H 0 5 C D ^ W O 
C O t ^ Q O O ) 0 5 0 H C N C O C O ^ l O C O C O ^ C X ) 0 5 0 
CMOIOIOIOIOOCOCOCOCOCOCOCOCOCOCOCO^ 
O l O O » C O O O C N I > r H C D O l O a > C O O O O | l > r H C O 
I O W 1 0 C D C O ^ N Q O C O O J 0 5 0 5 0 0 H H ( N ( N 
! > t ^ l > t ^ l > t ^ t ^ C ^ I > l > t > t > 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 
^iOCC^I>^00O^C^rH^OJCO^T^iq^CX^I>^CJ0C^G^T^ 
O O O O O O O O O O Q O a ) 0 ) O i O i C i 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 ) 0 ) 0 0 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 
OOOOOOOOOOCOOO&O)CftO>CX>O)0)CftCftOftO 
W o 
o o 
I 
PL. 
u 
§> £ 3 
O O 
H 3 W 
CO 
lO 
CM 
"5 to 
a 2 
o 8 
a I 
^22r?J2<3£2S£S^O O T - , w3c^ooo 
N T f ^ O S H x J U O O l H C O C O O O O C O C O 
H H H H N N W N C O C O C O 
^ t > H ^ C O H i O 0 0 N W 0 i ( N t O 0 5 C 0 
C M ^ ^ O i H T j « C O Q O H C O l O O O O < N l > 
H H H H N ( N ( N ( N C O C O C O 
C O I > O C O C O O C O C D O } O O C O O } O J C O C N ( N ^ O O H ^ C O O O O C O W ^ O W ^ 
H H H H N N C N N C O C O C O 
C O C D O ^ O l l O O O r H ^ O O C O C D O i 
C N x * « C 0 0 } r H 0 0 C 0 0 0 O C 0 l O ! > 0 > 
H H H H ( N ( N ( N C N N 
C O C O C C H ^ t > f l i ( N i O O O O 
N ^ C D 0 5 H W U 3 0 0 0 ( N I O 
H H H H C N N ( N 
CO iO 00 O CO 
<M ^ CD Oi TH 
l O O W O l O O i f l O l O O i O O W O O 
l > 0 ( N » 0 ^ 0 ( N i O I > 0 ( N U D ^ O U 3 
C O ^ r > ^ ^ O O O O Q 0 0 0 0 5 0 5 0 i O i O O 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
0 < O H C O H ( O H C O H C O H C O H C O H 
l O t > O C N l O I > 0 0 1 l O t > 0 0 1 l O t > 0 
c o c o i > r > t > i > o o o o c o o o o 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 
78-45-7 JUDICIAL CODE 204 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AJLJEL — Sexual partner's tort liability to Parent's child support liability as affected by 
other partner for fraudulent misrepresentation other parent's fraudulent misrepresentation re-
regarding sterility or use of birth control result- garding sterility or use of birth control, or 
ing in pregnancy, 2 A.L.R.5th 301. refusal to abort pregnancy, 2 A.L.R.5th 337. 
78-45-7. Determination of amount of support — Rebut-
table guidelines. 
(1) (a) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior 
court order unless there has been a material change of circumstance on 
the part of the obligor or obligee. 
(b) If the prior court order contains a stipulated provision for the 
automatic adjustment for prospective support, the prospective support 
shall be the amount as stated in the order, without a showing of a material 
change of circumstances, if the stipulated provision: 
(i) is clear and unambiguous; 
(ii) is self-executing; 
(iii) provides for support which equals or exceeds the base child 
support award required by the guidelines; and 
(iv) does not allow a decrease in support as a result of the obligor's 
voluntary reduction of income. 
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a material change in circumstances has 
occurred, the court determining the amount of prospective support shall 
require each party to file a proposed award of child support using the 
guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing 
award may be granted. 
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court 
shall establish support after considering all relevant factors, including but not 
limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
(f) the ages of the parties; and 
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of 
others. 
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all 
arrearages based upon the Uniform Child Support Guidelines described in this 
chapter. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 7; 1977, ch. 
145, § 10;1984,ch.l3,§ 2; 1989, ch. 214, § 3; 
1990, ch. 100, § 2; 1994, ch. 118, § 2; 1994, 
ch. 140, § 14. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment by ch. 140, effective May 2, 1994, substi-
tuted "the Uniform Child Support Guidelines 
described in this chapter" for "but not limited 
to: (a) the amount of public assistance received 
by the obligee, if any; and (b) the funds that 
have been reasonably and necessarily ex-
pended in support of spouse and children" at 
the end of Subsection (4). 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 118, effective 
July 1, 1994, designated former Subsection (1) 
as Subsection (l)(a) and added Subsection 
(l)(b). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
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Karen Penrose, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Jeffrey Penrose, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
APR 4 - 1996 
Marilyn M. Branch 
C:::, of the Court 
ORDER 
Case No. 950774-CA 
This matter is before the court upon its own motion. 
By order, dated March 27, 1996, this court dismissed the 
appeal due to appellant's failure to file her brief. It has now 
come to the court's attention that such order was issued due to 
clerical error. 
Now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the order of 
dismissal, dated March 27, 1996, is vacated and the appeal is 
reinstated. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that appellant's brief shall be filed 
and served by May 17, 1996. This due date takes into 
consideration the three days mailing provision of Rule 22(d), 
Utah R. App. P. 
Dated this 7 day o 
FOR THE COURT: 
f April, 1996 
^k~Ji^ 
Michael J . W i l k m s , Judge 
